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I. INTRODUCTION
Compensation for mental distress is the stepchild of tort law. Along
with punitive damages,' it offers a wildcard to litigants. Cases as
renowned as the McDonald's coffee 2 case have stimulated disdain and
mockery. Yet since ancient England, with the recognition of the tort of
assault, 3 English and American common law, 4 whether happily or not,
have embraced compensation for mental distress.
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.;
B.A., Yale College; Dip]. Crim., Cambridge University; J.D., Columbia Law
School. The author expresses his appreciation to Lucia M. Diamond for her
insightful and astute editing; Edward H. Ahn and Anton L. Hasenkampf for
their outstanding research assistance; and Divina Morgan for her expert
manuscript preparation.
See generally JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & M. STUART
MADDEN, UNDERSTANDING TORTS (3d ed. 2007); Clarence Morris, Punitive
Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1176-83 (1931).
2 See Liebeck v. McDonald's Restaurants, P.T.S., Inc., No. CV-93-02419, 1995
WL 360309, at *1 (D.N.M. Aug. 18, 1994), vacated, No. CV-93-02419, 1994
WL 16777704 (D.N.M. Nov 28, 1994) (initially awarding $160,000 in
compensation (including pain and suffering) for burns she received from a cup
of McDonald's coffee along with a staggering $2.7 million in punitive damages.
The plaintiff spilled the coffee on herself, and the primary fault attributed to
McDonald's was the temperature at which the coffee was served. Following a
reduction in the verdict, the parties settled for an undisclosed amount.); Gerlin,
A Matter of Degree: How a Jury' Decided That a Coffee Spill is Worth 2.9
Million, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Sept. 1, 1994, at Al.
3 The tort of assault was recognized in England as early as 1348, in I. de S. v. W.
de S., Y.B. Lib. Assis. 22 Edw. 3, f. 99, pl. 60 (1348) (awarding recovery when
a drunken would-be customer of a tavern swung at the innkeeper's wife with a
hatchet but did not strike her.
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The American Law Institute in its Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, 5 in Chapter 8 (Tentative
Draft No. 5, April 4, 2007), although making many very significant and
insightful contributions in the vast majority of its work, struggles in its
reformulation of the law of tort liability for mental distress. While
accurately reflecting much of the trends and mixture of the case law, the
project risks merely ratifying the disorder that exists in this subject
today. In this article, I attempt to look at the topics addressed by this
section of the Restatement draft and suggest a different approach, to
better effectuate the policy goals of tort law. The focus of my
disagreement is not with the intentional infliction of emotional distress
tort6 described in section 45, but with the far more troublesome rules of
recovery for negligently inflicted mental distress.7
4 Under the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1) (1965), "An actor is
subject to liability to another for assault if (a) he acts intending to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an
imminent apprehension of such contact and (b) the other is thereby put in such
imminent apprehension."
5 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS].
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965) articulates the law governing
outrageous conduct causing severe emotional distress as such:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to
liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other
results from it, for such bodily harm
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is
subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes
emotional distress
(a) to a member to of such person's family immediate family who
is present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily
harm, or
(b) to any person who is present at the time, if such distress results
in bodily harm
See generally DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 1.06.
7 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 (2007) defines the tort of negligent
conduct directly inflicting emotional distress on another as follows:
An actor whose negligent conduct causes serious emotional
disturbance to another is subject to liability to the other if the
conduct:
(a) places the other in immediate danger of bodily harm and the
emotional disturbance results from the danger; or
(b) occurs in the course of specified categories of activities,
undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is
especially likely to cause serious emotional disturbance.HeinOnline  -- 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 142 2008-2009
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There is no American jurisdiction that fails to recognize the tort of
assault . Assault, defined generally as the intent to create the
apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive contact, provides
compensation for mental distress without physical contact or injury.
9
Similarly, every American jurisdiction recognizes compensation for
mental distress caused by offensive contact resulting in no physical harm
via the tort of battery.10 From the earliest of cases, the courts have had to
struggle with questions of how to measure and validate such mental
distress. Issues of compensation are obscured by the lack of any
measurable market for pain, or any measurable remedy that has been
accepted for such distress.' In addition to compensation concerns
however, there has also been concern focused on deterrence and
retributive notions of justice that universally demand civil remedies.'
2
Indeed in this respect the tort of assault, as it is generally recognized and
articulated by the Restatement of Torts, is problematic. It compensates
only for imminent apprehension, leaving apprehension of future contact
uncompensated, while at the same time compensating for mental distress
caused by the mere apprehension of offensive and not harmful or even
frightening contact. 13 In part this limitation may reflect an early
8 See generally W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 10 (5th ed. 1984) (discussing development of the tort of assault);
DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 1.03.
9 See Yale v. Town of Allenstown, 969 F. Supp. 798, 801 (D.N.H. 1997)
(holding that a police officer in training stated a case of assault against another
officer who, while standing behind her, drew his firearm and pointed it at her,
leading her to fear that she was going to be shot). See generally DIAMOND ET
AL., supra note 1, at § 1.03(A-B); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 33-35
(2000).
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965) provides that:
(1) An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if
(a) he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with
the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent
apprehension of such contact, and
(b) an offensive contact with the person of the other directly or
indirectly results.
See generally DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 1.02 (discussing development
and modem approach to the tort of battery); DOBBS, supra note 9, at §§ 28-31
(discussing development and modem approach to the tort of battery).
"1 See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 14.03 (E).
12 See generally KEETON, supra note 8, at § 4 (discussing the factors affecting
tort liability).
13 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21 (1965). See generally Newman v.
Gehl Corp., 731 F. Supp. 1048 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that statements that
anyone who was thinking of acting against the company should "think twice
because he could make a phone call and that person could be taken care of' was
not sufficient to state a claim for assault because the threat was insufficiently
imminent). HeinOnline  -- 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 143 2008-2009
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uneasiness with compensating for mental distress except in cases of very
specific and immediate acts of potential violence. Nevertheless, there is a
potential inconsistency with compensating for the threat of the imminent
impact of an apple pie without compensating for a threat of serious
physical harm to occur even five minutes later. Clearly the courts seem
most comfortable compensating for mental distress in very
circumscribed and limited physical encounters typical of physical tort
recovery. It is interesting also to note that the tort of assault coincides
with the rules of self defense, which allow defensive action directed
against the perpetrator only in the context of an imminent threat.14
The much newer tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
emerged in the twentieth century to supplement glaring omissions in the
tort of assault. 5 The Restatements, following California precedents,
ratified compensation for extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally
causing extreme mental distress.' 6 Consequently, the threat to pummel
an individual could potentially result in liability, although unrecognized
in the tort of assault. While this tort originally required physical
manifestation of the emotional distress, modem jurisdictions generally
dispense with that requirement. 17 Consequently, what was once a tort
that had at least some basis in physical contact, albeit indirectly through
the intensity of the emotional distress, now stands without any nexus
with physical impact or injury. Unlike the traditional tort of assault,
intentional infliction of mental distress is remarkably vague, leaving
juries and judges to define what constitutes extreme and outrageous
conduct in modem society.18 This vagueness has prompted First
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 (1965) (articulating the privilege of
self defense as such:
(1) An actor is privileged to use reasonable force, not intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily harm, to defend himself against unprivileged harmful or
offensive contact or other bodily harm which he reasonably believes another is
about to inflict intentionally upon him.)
See also DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 2.02; KEETON, supra note 8, at §
19.
15 See, e.g,. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (1958)
(recognizing the tort of assault for the first time). In this case however, the court
found that mere rude language not calculated to cause severe emotional distress
was not sufficient to warrant liability; see also DOBBS, supra note 9, at §§ 303-
307.
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965). See also State Rubbish
Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330 (1952) (holding that recovery is
allowed where physical injury results from intentionally subjecting the plaintiff
to serious mental distress).
" See JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 55 (3d ed. 2008);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 63 cmt. d (1965) ("liability has been
found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so
[Vol. 16:1
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Amendment concerns and required the intervention of the United States
Supreme Court, in Hustler v. Falwell, to ensure that the tort does not
chill protected speech that some find outrageous. 19 Interestingly,
however, the tort opens up a plethora of potential liability for
intentionally inflicted mental distress. Both the Restatement and
American courts accept relatively open ended invitations to assert mental
distress claims when the culpability is intentional. Further expanding
potential claims is the fact that intentionality is defined by many courts
20and the Restatement as either purposeful or substantial certainty.
Finally, based on historical cases, the Restatement and most courts
would also recognize reckless culpability as a basis for imposing liability
under an otherwise intentional tort. 21 As the next section will
demonstrate the courts are much more confused over the parameters for
negligently inflicted mental distress.
II. ZONE OF DANGER AND BYSTANDER RECOVERY
Negligent infliction of mental distress poses an enormous variety of
instances where compensation could be conceivably awarded.22 Many of
the parameters remain vague and undefined. Indeed, the most common
types of negligently inflicted mental distress are rarely addressed by
cases but remain lurking as potential directions for a new tort
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community").
Despite the elaboration however, the standard still fails to be grounded in any
measure of objectivity, and relies on the judge and jury to determine what
behavior is of the type that is so extreme and outrageous "to go beyond all
bounds of decency.
19 Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (holding that speech about a public
figure is protected by the first amendment such that in the absence of New York
Times malice, the printing of material that is false or with reckless disregard
towards its veracity, there can be no liability for intentional infliction of mental
distress. In this case, Hustler magazine printed a fictitious ad which depicted
Minister Falwell engaging in sexual acts with his mother, but because the ad
stated that it was fictitious and clearly didn't hold itself out as true it did not
constitute New York Times malice, and therefore was protected.).
20 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8a (1965) ("The word 'intent' is
used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires
to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it."); see also DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1,
at § 1.01; KEETON, supra note 8, at § 24.
21 Boyle v. Chandler, 138 A. 273 (Del. 1927) (exemplifying a very early
instance of a court recognizing recklessness as a sufficient basis of liability in a
case of an improper burial.). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
cmt. i (1965).
22 See KEETON, supra note 8, at § 54 (establishing that there may be claims for
mental disturbance with physical injury, mental disturbance alone, or mental
disturbance by witnessing peril or harm to another).HeinOnline  -- 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 145 2008-2009
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explosion.23 Understandably, the Restatement (Third) attempts to
severely restrain the contexts where such mental distress claims would
be recognized as viable.24 Regretfully, the historical recognition of
mental distress claims follow closely on the heels of classic physical tort
claims and, as a result, fail to enhance any meaningful or comprehensive
policy goals. Restatement (Third) § 47: "Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Disturbance Resulting from Bodily Harm to a Third Person"
reflects this historic trend.25
Initially, negligent infliction of mental distress was restricted to
parasitic pain resulting from a physical injury. In many ways, this was
similar in form to the type of compensation awarded for an intentional
battery claim. Just as in battery,26 the mental distress was secondary and
27supplemental to the wrongful physical impact. These early
developments recognized that physical pain was a loss worthy of
compensation, although the measurement of appropriate compensation
would always remain problematic. 28 As noted above, issues of deterrence
and justice demanded that the pain not be ignored. Otherwise, there
could be serious issues of under-deterrence and inadequate compensation
for injury, a primary component of which was mental pain or distress.
23 See infra note 115 & accompanying text.
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS § 47 cmt. f (2007) provides that:
Some courts state that the actual test is foreseeability and that a
person can recover even if the formal requirements are not
satisfied. This approach is unsatisfactory because genuine
emotional disturbance can occur and is foreseeable in many
situations in which courts clearly would not permit recovery. For
example, a negligent airline that causes the death of a beloved
celebrity can foresee genuine emotional disturbance on the part of
the celebrity's fans but no court would permit recovery for
emotional disturbance under these circumstances.
Id.
25 Id. at 82-107.
26 "The minute disturbance of the nerve centers caused by fear, shock or other
emotions does not constitute bodily harm. It may, however, result in some
appreciable illness or have some other effect upon the physical condition of the
body which constitutes bodily harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 15 cmt.
b (1965). See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 1.02[c].
27 "The mental distress recoverable was, in essence, the pain and suffering
associated with a negligently caused physical injury, such as a broken leg." See
DIAMOND, supra note 17, at 324.
28 Impact has been defined broadly to even designate a slight electric shock and
x-rays as sufficient "impact" for a claim of negligent infliction of mental
distress. The artificiality of determining this impact has led to some jurisdictions
to abolish the impact requirement. See Battalla v. State of New York, 176
N.E.2d 729, 731 (N.Y. 1961); see also Daley v. LaCroix, 179 N.W.2d 390, 395
(Mich. 1970); DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 10.01[B][1].
[Vol. 16:1
HeinOnline  -- 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 146 2008-2009
Fall 2008] Rethinking Compensation for Mental Distress 147
Subsequently, courts began to allow compensation for negligently
inflicted mental distress even when the impact was trivial, resulting in no
physical injury.2 9 In such cases, the compensation was entirely for the
mental distress. 30 Nevertheless, the classic tort paradigm of an accident
leading to physical contact remained.
Subsequently, a majority of American courts adopted the "zone of
danger" rule reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.31 Under this
rule, a victim who suffers a near miss of a physical impact negligently
caused by the defendant can be compensated for mental distress arising
from the incident, at least when the distress causes physical
manifestations, preferably a heart attack although severe stomach trouble
could often suffice.32 Again this rule dovetails the classic physical tort
cases and simply extends liability to a near impact victim who barely
escapes direct physical injury but suffers indirect physical injury by the
frightening scenario of the accident. It should be noted that the
measurement of mental distress still remains problematic since the
physical injury is only a prerequisite and not the measure of the mental
injury.
The Restatement (Third) ratifies the rule first proposed in Dillon v.
Legg,33 which for a long time represented a well-recognized minority
alternative, as the new majority position.34 In Dillon v. Legg, the
29 See Christy Bros. Circus v. Turnage, 144 S.E. 680 (Ga. Ct. App. 1938)
(holding that plaintiff, a spectator at the circus, could recover for mental distress
with no physical injuries, since the plaintiff technically suffered an impact from
horse droppings); DIAMOND, supra note 17, at 324.
30 Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 45 N.E. 354 (N.Y. 1896) (illustrating the
injustice of the physical impact rule. The plaintiff suffered severe shock when
she was nearly trampled by the defendant's oncoming horses and she had a
miscarriage. Unfortunately, the lack of any physical impact meant the denial of
recovery.). See DIAMOND, supra note 17, at 324-325.
31 See Tobin v. Grossman, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969) (illustrating a case, where a
mother witnessed the immediate aftermath of an accident where her son was run
over and injured. New York Court of Appeals dismissed the mother's negligent
infliction of mental distress claim and argued that she must have been in the
zone of physical danger.), DIAMOND, supra note 17, at 325.
32 Some debate exists over what is a "physical manifestation." Compare Olson
v. Connerly, 445 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "panic
attacks" including extreme abdominal pain constitute sufficient physical injury)
with Robbins v. Kass, 516 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ill. App. 1987) (holding that
crying, sleeplessness, increased migraine headaches and upset feelings do not
constitute sufficient physical symptoms to warrant recovery). See DIAMOND ET
AL., supra note 1, at § 10.01[B][2].
33 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
34 "Most American courts have now adopted some version of this rule [of Dillon
v. Legg]." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 47 (2007), at 82-83.HeinOnline  -- 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 147 2008-2009
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California Supreme Court rejected the then-majority rule and allowed a
bystander who witnessed an accident outside the zone of danger to
recover under certain circumstances.35 While the Dillon case itself was
potentially far more flexible in ascertaining when liability would exist,
factors articulated in the decision quickly became fixed rules for many
jurisdictions, including California.36 While those rules tend to vary
slightly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, two fundamental requirements
remain generally fixed. As the Restatement (Third) characterizes the
rules, the victim must perceive the event contemporaneously and be a
close family member of the person suffering the bodily injury.3 7 Many
jurisdictions also require physical manifestations although the
Restatement (Third) does not, following the lead of California and some
other states.38
There are many policy questions raised by the Restatement (Third)
and the majority's current position on bystander recovery; it provides for
both over and under-inclusion. For example, the close family member
who comes upon the accident after the event will undoubtedly suffer
severe mental distress. Some jurisdictions are more rigorous in limiting
latecomers to the event. The current California position requires that the
bystander be at the scene of the event, while other courts would allow
3' Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968). See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1,
at § 10.01[C][2].
36 A substantial minority of states expand liability to include the number of
factors articulated by Dillon. See, e.g., Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw.
1974); D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 326 A.2d 129 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1973); Miller v. Cook, 273 N.W.2d 567 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); D'Ambra v.
United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975); see DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at
§10.01[C][2]; KEETON,supra note 8, at § 54; at 366 n.74.
37 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 47 (2007), at 88, provides that:
Consequently, the requirements of contemporaneous perception
and a close family relationship are pragmatic concessions to the
need to draw lines, coupled with the judgment that the shock of
contemporaneously perceiving bodily injury to a close family
member is an especially traumatic experience. Both requirements
must be satisfied; they are not merely factors to be considered in an
ultimate judgment about whether liability can be imposed.
Id.
38 California and some other states have done away with the physical
manifestation requirement in the bystander context. See Hedlund v. Superior
Court, 669 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1983). See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at §
10.01[C][2]. California also by legislation now allows registered "domestic
partners" to qualify for recovery under negligent infliction of mental distress
and wrongful death claims. See CAL. [FAM.] CODE § 297; CAL. [CIv.] CODE §
1714.01.
[Vol. 16:1
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bystanders who arrive at the immediate aftermath to recover. 39 For
example, a mother who arrived to see her child dying of electrocution
moments after hearing an unexplained noise was excluded from recovery
since the parent had not witnessed the accident. 40 This limitation can be
justified by the need to constrain liability, but it is harder (although not
impossible) to claim that it represents more than an arbitrary limit.4 1 Is it
truly likely that the close family member witnessing the accident as it
takes place, as opposed to the family member who arrives later or hears
about it later and then sees the victim, has suffered greater mental
distress? In any event, it is clear that the close family member in the
latter instance has suffered a real loss which may not be compensated by
an actor who culpably caused that injury.
39 Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (holding that:
[A] plaintiff may recovery damages for emotional distress caused
by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if,
but only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim;
(2) is present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time
it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim;
and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress - a reaction
beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness
and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.).
"Some courts permit recovery to a close family relative whose emotional injury
follows closely on the heels of the accident." See Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's
Sons, Inc., 413 N.E.2d 690, 697 (Mass. 1980). One court recently broadened
this factor to an "almost-contemporaneous" standard, holding that a "family
member may recover for emotional distress caused by observing an injured
relative at the scene of an accident after its occurrence and before there is
substantial change in the relative's condition or location." See Hegel v.
McMahon, 960 P.2d 424, 429 (Wash. 1998); see also DIAMOND ET AL., supra
note 1, at § 10.01[C][2].
'0 See Hathaway v. Superior Court, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440-41 (Ct. App. 1980).
In Hathaway, no duty was owed to plaintiff who rushed to the scene in time to
see her child still suffering the effect of being electrocuted by a defective water
cooler. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 10.01[C][2].
41 See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 10.01[C][4]:
While reasonable foreseeability is an effective limit on physical
loss, it is a far less effective limit on liability for mental distress.
Consequently, without special limits, reasonable foreseeable
mental distress imposes a large burden of liability on defendants
and ultimately the insured community. This increases the costs of
legitimate and productive industries prone to unavoidable instances
of negligence.
HeinOnline  -- 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 149 2008-2009
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Bystander recovery can also be over-inclusive in potentially
providing redundant or excessive compensation. A bystander who
witnesses the death of a spouse as a result of a tortfeasor's negligence
already has a wrongful death claim. 42 In addition to potential bystander
claims, a spouse can maintain a loss of consortium and society action
caused by the other spouse's personal injuries. 43 Furthermore, the injured
spouse has a personal injury claim including potentially mental distress
injuries, which will compensate the family unit.44 Finally, heirs of the
deceased victim may have survival claims, including inheritance of the
deceased's pain and suffering while dying in the accident as well as
punitive damages where appropriate in many but not all jurisdictions.45
Consequently, there may be accidents where the mental distress claim is
almost a redundant add-on to a massive family unit recovery, providing
insignificant added deterrence or retributive justice. Other cases, as
noted above, lack any real compensation for significant mental distress
loss where wrongful death actions are not available, or limited by small
pecuniary loss, and loss of consortium is not available. The excluded
clearly include in most but not all jurisdictions non-close family
members and, in the case of loss of consortium, parent-child
relationships.
46
In essence, as I have argued previously, there is a feast-or-famine
syllogism to bystander recovery as the majority and Restatement (Third)
articulate. Some families qualify for wrongful death and personal injury
via survival actions, loss of spousal consortium and punitive damages,
42 See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 10.03[C]; STUART M. SPEISER,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH AND INJURY § 4.3, at 67 (3d ed. 1988). See
generally Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REv.
1043 (1965) (tracing historical evolution of the claim from English courts to
American common law).
43 Although recovery was originally granted only to husband who lost his wife's
services, virtually all states now allow either spouse to recovery for loss of
consortium, which is grounded in such intangible harms as loss of
companionship, affection, and society. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at §
10.03[B]; see also 2 DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-
RESTITUTION § 8.1(5), at 402 (2d ed. 1993) (requiring evidence of "reduced
sexual companionship," the inability to "engage in sports or social activities as
they did before," and evidence of new negative personality traits caused by the
injury).
44 See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 14.03.
45 "Virtually all jurisdictions permit both survival actions and wrongful death
actions by statute... . The survival action typically permits the estate to recover
the decedent's medical expenses, lost wages and, perhaps, her pain and
suffering." See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 10.03[D].
46 See Borer v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 19 Cal. 3d 441, 448-49 (1977) (citing
concerns of multiple liability, the court held that children could not recover for
loss of consortium and society).
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while other families may recover very little for the accident even though
they may suffer the same degree of mental distress. They are simply on
the wrong side of the timeline in witnessing the accident. Even if, as
argued by some, that delay mitigates the mental suffering (which I see
no empirical evidence to document), there can be no doubt that a mental
distress loss has occurred but is not being compensated by the culpable
tortfeasor.
There are reasons for the current rule. Foremost, there is particular
concern not to overburden the insured community with endless mental
distress claims. This is particularly compelling since many would argue
compensation for mental distress has limited functionality because
money cannot replace the loss or ensure mental tranquility. Secondly, the
current system is well within the tort comfort zone for accident
compensation. It takes a classic accident scenario and simply includes
those within the zone of danger or immediately beyond its parameters
and treats the situation as it would the typical tort accident. The irony of
this approach is increased compensation in this paradigm where
compensation is already extensive but none or extremely limited
compensation in the atypical tort scenario where the mental distress
victim is not immediately at the scene. The justification for this is again
the need to restrict overly burdensome liability in the context of mental
distress which does not enjoy the limits that physics imposes on the
physical injuries of an accident. In a previous article, I endorsed the
proposal to limit recovery to special economic damages but to expand
the potential plaintiffs. 47 For example, a grandfather who suffers a heart
attack hearing that his grandson has been negligently killed could
recover the economic consequences of his distress, but no other
bystander could recover more than the economic consequences of the
distress. While by no means a perfect solution, the proposal I found
persuasive attempts to allocate similar resources in a more equitable and
functional way rather than merely dovetail classic tort recovery
scenarios.
As the following sections illustrate, the real misfortune of endorsing
this classic approach rather than seeking a more creative solution is the
Restatement's position on the destruction of chattel and distress over
future illness and injury.
Ill. LIABILITY FOR PETS AND HEIRLOOMS
Courts are divided over whether to compensate for the emotional
harm caused by the destruction or injury of a pet or family heirloom.
41 John L. Diamond, Dillon v. Legg Revisited: Toward a Unified Theory of
Compensating Bystanders and Relatives for Intangible Injuries, 35 HASTINGS
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Many courts, endorsed by the proposed Restatement (Third), reject
compensating for the anguish caused by such destruction. 48 Carbasho v.
Musulin49 is one such typical case decided by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia. In Carbasho, defendant motorist had
negligently struck and killed plaintiffs dog, and the plaintiff argued that
the loss of companionship meant that market value was an insufficient
measure of damages.50 Although the state legislature had removed a key
limiting phrase ("but in no case involving a dog can recovery be had in
excess of the assessed value of such dog") from the West Virginia Code,
the appellate court pointed out that state law still classifies dogs as
personal property and that damages were the fair market value of the
property at the time of destruction.5 1 Damages for sentimental value,
mental suffering and emotional distress were thus not recoverable for the
negligently inflicted death of a dog.52 While the Restatement (Second)
has never expressly addressed the issue, the Restatement (Third)
53explicitly rejects recovery.
48 For a list of cases, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j,
Reporters' Note (2007). See, e.g., Roman v. Carroll, 621 P.2d 307, 308 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1980) (holding that plaintiff could not recover for watching another
dog attack her poodle because one may not recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress while witnessing injury to property); Lachenman v. Stice,
838 N.E.2d 451, 466-67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that the loss of a dog was
only an economic one which did not allow for damages beyond fair market
value); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Burger King Corp., 808 N.Y.S.2d 74, 74 (App. Div.
2006) (holding that plaintiffs had no cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress because the plaintiffs were never in any physical danger);
Feger v. Warwick Animal Shelter, 814 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701-702 (App. Div. 2006)
(refusing to allow recovery for emotional harm plaintiff allegedly suffered from
the loss of her champion pure-bred Persian cat); Beaumont v. Basham, 205
S.W.3d 608, 615-18 (Tex. App. 2006) (upholding jury awards for mental
anguish against sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges).
4' 618 S.E.2d 368 (W. Va. 2005). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46
cmt. j, Reporters Note (2007).
50 Carbasho v. Musulin, 618 S.E.2d at 369-370.
511d. at 371.
52 Id. The court also notes that this is the general rule for the majority of
jurisdictions and helpfully cites a number of other cases. Id.
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j, Reporters Note (2007),
provides that:
The Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 436 and 436A, with its
broad restriction on recovery for negligently inflicted emotional
disturbance, implied omitted recovery for emotional harm resulting
from property damage. Cases decided since the Second
Restatement, despite the liberalization of recovery for emotional
disturbance, have not expanded to encompass emotional harm due
to damage to property.
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On the other hand, there are ample cases supporting recovery. 54 In
Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station,55 the family dog died from heat
prostration while in the care of a quarantine station because the animal
was left in a hot van without ventilation for at least an hour.56 The court
held the owners of the dog could seek damages for serious emotional
distress caused by the negligent destruction of their dog if the mental
distress were reasonably foreseeable from the accident.57 Since the
plaintiffs were neither eyewitnesses to their dog's death nor located
within a reasonable distance of the accident, the Hawaii Supreme Court
ruled that just witnessing the consequences, rather than the actual
accident, was sufficient to recover for emotional distress. 58 The court
noted that Hawaii had allowed recovery for mental distress suffered from
the negligent destruction of property for more than 10 years, without
validating the fears of unlimited liability.59
A variety of policy arguments have been advanced for denying non-
economic recovery for destruction of chattels. 60 Clearly, there has always
been ambiguity over the advantages of compensating for losses that
cannot be measured in economic terms61; there is no mechanism for
making the plaintiff whole in the way possible when compensating for
market value losses. There is also concurrent concern over the cost that
increased liability will impose on the insured community, making
54 See, e.g., Peloquin v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 367 So. 2d 1246 (3d Cir.
1979) (allowing "awards for mental anguish, humiliation, etc." for the wrongful
trapping and destruction of plaintiffs' cat); Knowles Animal Hospital, Inc. v.
Wills, 360 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (affirming the original jury
trial verdict element of plaintiffs' mental pain and suffering for a defendant
animal hospital's gross negligence by burning plantiffs dog. The jury had
awarded $13,000 against defendant animal hospital for placing the animal on a
heating pad unattended for almost two days.) See W.E. Shipley, Annotation,
Recovery for Mental Shock or Distress in Connection with Injury to or
Interference with Tangible Property, 28 A.L.R.2d 1070 (2006).
" 632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt.
j, Reporters' Note (2007).
56 Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P. 2d at 1067.
51 Id. at 1068-1069.
58 Id. at 1069.
59 Id. at 1071.
60 See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Emily J. Laird, Non-Economic Damages
in Pet Litigation: The Serious Need to Preserve a Rational Rule, 33 PEPP. L.
REV. 227 (2006).
61 Id. at 249-50; see also United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920, 924-25 (10th
Cir. 1958) (finding that $3,500 for Native Americans' mental suffering caused
by the government's destruction of their horses, sheep, goats, and cattle was
"wholly conjectural and picked out of thin air"). See generally W.E. Shipley,
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productive activities more expensive and arguably less accessible for
what is seen as a nebulous benefit for the additional compensation.62
Finally, there is a lurking concern for exaggerated and fraudulent claims,
unchecked by any empirical measurement of the emotional 
loSS. 63
These arguments, of course, apply across the board for all mental
distress liability cases. The issue really focuses on whether the benefits
of providing emotional loss compensation, perceived in other contexts
where emotional liability is allowed, apply with less or more intensity to
injuries to pets and heirlooms. Alternatively, one could argue that
deference to current practice and historical precedents justifies
acquiescence to compensation for emotional distress in other contexts
but should not be extended to any area where emotional liability is now
not definitively recognized.64
As numerous cases conclude, however, there are strong arguments
for compensating emotional distress in general and in the context of
beloved chattels, including pets. Compensating for the market value of
the pet simply does not reflect the loss or value to the owner or even to
society's recognition of its value. 65 It hardly appears satisfactory to run
over a neighbor's dog and then pay the neighbor $25, suggesting the
neighbor keep the change. No one denies that emotional loss is real, nor
is it so idiosyncratic that society could not estimate or assume certain
minimal emotional consequences of the pet's lOSS. 6 6 Some courts
62 Schwartz & Laird, supra note 60, at 260-67.
63 Id. at 232-233.
64 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j, Reporters' Note
(2007).
65 Indeed, some pet cases may involve dogs without any "ascertainable market
value," for example, if the dog was a gift and a mixed breed. See Brousseau v.
Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Civ. Ct. 1980) (noting that the dog was the
plaintiffs sole and constant companion since the death of her husband and that
the loss of companionship was a proper element to consider in establishing the
actual value of the dog); see also Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., 415
N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (Civ. Ct. 1979) (arguing that a pet is "not just a thing but
occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal
property," the court expressly declined to follow earlier cases that had classified
animals as property). But see Gluckman v. American Airlines, 844 F. Supp.
151, 1581 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (criticizing the Corso opinion and other similar
opinions as "aberrations flying in the face of overwhelming authority to the
contrary").
66 Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 629 S.E.2d 181, 186-87 (Va. 2006) (despite holding
that Virginia law merely classifies animals as personal property, the court
admitted that:
[i]t is beyond debate that animals, particularly dogs and cats, when
kept as pets and companions, occupy a position in human
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recognize the horror of the intentional example above and allow
recovery in certain malicious contexts for emotional lOSS. 6 7 There are, of
course, also potential punitive damages, although recent case law may
limit substantially the amount by reference to the value of the chattel.68
Nevertheless, there are reasons why numerous courts allow recovery for
destruction of pets even in the context of negligence.
Perhaps one of the strongest arguments for compensating for
negligence is the deterrence against unreasonable careless actions.
Unlike other accident compensation systems, negligence does more than
compensate; in addition, it helps to avoid accidents by encouraging
businesses and others to invest in the appropriate precautions.69 It has
been strongly argued that imposing emotional loss liability on pets
would cause substantially increased price expenses for veterinarian
services.70 These price increases would be necessary to reflect increased
malpractice liability, which has long been a contentious issue in the
medical industry, where many tort reform statutes have attempted to
place caps on liability for emotional loss. 71 It has been further argued
that these price increases will hurt pets by limiting access to veterinarian
services, and that pets are better off with the cheaper pricing that reflects
affections far removed from livestock. Especially in the case of
owners who are disabled, aged or lonely, an emotional bond may
exist with a pet resembling that between parent and child, and the
loss of such an animal may give rise to grief approaching that
attending the loss of a family member.)
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j, Reporters' Note (2007).
67 See La Porte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1964)
(upholding awarded compensatory damages of $2000 and punitive damages of
$1000 in a case where the defendant, a sanitation worker, hurled a garbage can
at the plaintiffs miniature dachshund, Heidi, and killed her); Levine v.
Knowles, 197 So. 2d 329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (allowing recovery beyond
market value for defendant veterinarian's malicious and willful cremation of a
pet's body to avoid consequences of autopsy and probable malpractice, while
barring recovery for mental pain and anguish without physical injury caused by
simple negligence); Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man's and Woman's Best Friend:
The Moral and Legal Status of Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47
(2002). Such conduct could indeed constitute intentional infliction of mental
distress. See supra notes 15-20 & accompanying text.
68 See Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 812-13 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001)
(supporting punitive damages and claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress for cases involving animals); Huss, supra note 67, at 91-92.
69 See Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation, 82 NEB. L. REV.
783, 83 1-832 (2004).
7 .See Schwartz & Laird, supra note 60, at 260-63.
71 Schwartz and Laird further argue that such damage caps would be quickly
challenged under state constitutional principles and eventually open the
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the extremely limited liability based on the very low market value of the
typical house pet.72 The argument is a serious one and appears to be
accepted by the proposed Restatement (Third) as one basis for expressly
opposing liability for emotional loss caused by injury to pets.73 The
difficulty with this argument is that in many ways it is a broad attack on
the tort of negligence rather than a specific response to a particular
industry's dilemma. Without compensating for a full loss, negligence
liability underdeters against wrongful conduct.7 4
Wrongful death claims illustrate this dilemma. Historically,
wrongful death compensation was limited to the economic loss to the
survivor caused by the victim's death.75 While this worked well enough
for breadwinners, this compensation measurement provided inadequate
value to, among others, children, the destitute, and the elderly. 76 In one
particularly striking wrongful death case, three children killed in an
automobile accident were valued at roughly $270 each, well less than the
value of the car radio.77 Consequently, the strong modem trend has been
to expand wrongful death compensation to include the intangible loss of
society or companionship value for survivors.78 In the context of
potential elder abuse in retirement homes, as well as medical procedures
for the elderly, this expansion provides an economic incentive to invest
in appropriate and reasonable precautions. While the image of a kindly
old family practitioner cavalierly taking risks to save money on an
economically low value patient such as a child or the elderly might
appear generally preposterous, it is far less preposterous to recognize
that national health care industries will allocate more resources to those
72 Id. at 266. See also Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Amber E. Dean, Veterinarians in
the Doghouse: Are Pet Suits Economically Viable?, THE BRIEF, Spring 2002, at
43; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Barking Up the Wrong Tree, L.A. TIMES, June 22,
1998, at B5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j, Reporters' Note
(2007).
73 "The rule against liability for emotional harm due to injury to a pet, especially
in the case of veterinary malpractice, serves to make veterinary services more
readily available for pets." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j,
Reporters' Note (2007).
14 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 220 (5th ed. 1998)
(asserting that the economic purpose of negligence is "the deterrence of
inefficient accidents"); Livingston, supra note 69, at 814 & fn. 188.
71 See Jane Goodman ET AL., Money, Sex, and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful
Death Damage Awards, 25 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 263 (1991).
76 Id.
77 Selders v. Armentrout, 220 N.W.2d 222 (Neb. 1974).
71 See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 1, at § 10.03 [C][2].
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sectors posing greater economic risks in order to maximize investor
profits. 9
If the law of torts has value as a system to reduce accidents,
massively undervaluing loss eliminates any meaningful deterrent role. In
this context, the veterinarian industry would appear, despite its advocacy
to the contrary, a particularly poor choice to be exempt from any non-
economic liability. First, in the medical context, there is often massive
economic loss absent in the pet service industries.8 ° While euthanasia is
common and accepted for pets developing medical complications, it is
not acceptable in most human contexts.81 Consequently, malpractice
leading to further medical deterioration of a person can have substantial
economic consequences while the veterinarian industry can simply
euthanize a mistake. Furthermore, the medical industry has issues of
rehabilitation and maintenance costs for injured patients that simply are
not applicable for pets.82 In brief, unlike most other industries, the
veterinarian industry benefits from substantial investment in a chattel
that, in most cases, has only a nominal market value.83 Indeed, the entire
cost of veterinarian services ordinarily exceeds the economic value of
79 "It is actually to veterinarians' and other service providers' advantage to
support the establishment of a structured system in order to provide certainty
and avoid any surprises from judicial decisions that may place a significant
value on an animal." Huss, supra note 67, at 104.
80 See Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that
"[i]t is undisputed that Hair Bear, an unregistered mixed breed with no
particular training or skill other than as a companion, had no market value");
Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 285; Morgan v. Kroupa, 702 A.2d 630, 632-33 (Vt.
1997) (stating that "[a] pet dog generally has no substantial market value as
such ... [1]ike most pets, its worth is not primarily financial, but emotional").
81 See Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, 35 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 479, 505 (2004); see also Sara A. Wiswall, Animal Euthanasia and Duties
Owed to Animals, 30 McGEORGE L. REv. 801 (1999) (describing new
California legislation on euthanasia). Note that California has a policy against
the euthanization of adoptable animals. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1834.4 (West
Supp. 2004). See Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, 35 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 479, fn.326 (2004).
82 Such practices will vary depending on the type of animal. ORLAND SOAVE,
ANIMALS, THE LAW AND VETERINARY MEDICINE 164 (4th ed. 2000). See Huss,
Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 81, at fn. 14.
" This problem is compounded by the inability to recover for non-economic
damages. "Without the prospect of recovering nonpecuniary damages, pet
owners will have little incentive to sue for the destruction of their animals,
knowing that attorneys' fees per se are not recoverable from the defendant."
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the pet. 84 Clearly, the love Americans have for their pets has created a
lucrative market where demand for services creates high pricing.
85
In the context of pets, the proposed Restatement has eviscerated any
meaningful deterrence for negligent conduct. Obviously, market
competition, professional licensing, and humane impulses may
encourage responsible veterinarian treatment. 86 The question becomes
whether the veterinarian industry in the case of the typical pet lacks a
need for tort accountability. The market comparison appears particularly
weak as a disincentive for negligent conduct. Veterinary skills, like
medicine, are not accessible to the lay person, and the pet owner will
consequently have difficulty recognizing a bad result and veterinary
malpractice. Since pets do not talk, the nature of the ailment is even
less accessible than for humans and a completely wrong diagnosis or
treatment scenario is even likely to be totally unrecognized. 88 This makes
it difficult for other non-market systems such as licensing standards and
professional sanctions to provide effective accountability as well. If the
law of torts has a role in society, the veterinarian industry does not
appear to be one where alternative systems of accountability are strong
or effective.
The linchpin of the argument against meaningful tort accountability
in the veterinarian industry appears to be based on primarily the cheaper
accessibility of services that otherwise would be denied to pets. 89 Again,
the argument has some force. Many Americans go without adequate
14 See Jerry Gleeson, Dog-gone Expensive, J. NEWS (Westchester County,
N.Y.), Dec. 26, 2001, at ID. Gleeson cited an American Animal Hospital
Association survey where more that one third of the respondents said they
"would spend any amount of money to save the lives of their pets. Eighteen
percent ... said they had spent more than $1,000 on veterinary care for their pets
in the previous 12 months." Id. See also Huss, Valuation in Veterinary
Malpractice, supra note 81, at fn.17; David J. Jefferson & Mary Carmichael, A
Pampered Pet Nation, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 2007,
http://web.archive.org/web/20070710180033/http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 8
846816/site/newsweek (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
85 According to the American Pet Products Manufacturers Association, pet
owners will spend $40 billion on pet care and an estimated $50 billion by the
end of the decade. Jefferson & Carmichael, supra note 84.
86 See Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 81, at 488-490.
87 Veterinarians go through a minimum of six years of training, with two years
of study in a pre-veterinary program and four years in a college of veterinary
medicine. After obtaining a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine (D.V.M.) degree,
individuals in most states apply for a license and must pass a national board
examination. See Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 81, at
488.
" See Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 81, at 504-505.
89 Schwartz & Laird, supra note 60, at 260-67.
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health care and treatment for their own families. 90 Yet, as noted above,
veterinary services are, in many cases, already expensive and constitute a
multi-billion industry. 91 This can be justified by the high level of
92education required of veterinarians and the demand for their services.
Nevertheless, there is an enormous difference between the astronomical
liability imposed on medical practitioners in torts and the virtual
immunity for the veterinarian industry. Imposing some loss of society or
mental anguish compensation, where proven, hardly demands that the
compensation equate with the anguish or loss of companionship of
human loss as well as the enormous economic consequences simply not
existing in the animal context. 93 As endorsed by the Restatement (Third),
there is simply an enormous disjuncture between the charge for services
and the compensation for any losses. 94 Indeed, some would argue that
compensation for emotional loss or loss of companionship can not be
provided because the companionship value may equate or exceed the
loss of human companionship.95 Still, to deny any compensation hardly
seems an appropriate response to the significance of the loss, especially
in the absence of other effective deterrent mechanisms.
96
It is true that liability insurance would add to costs just as it does for
all industries. Nevertheless, this liability would not in any way equate
90 Nearly 16% of the entire U.S. population, or 46.6 million, are uninsured,
according to recent Census estimates. Julie Appleby, Consumer Unease with
U.S. Health Care Grows, USA TODAY, Oct. 16, 2006,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2006-10-15-health-concem-
usatx.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
91 See Gleeson, supra note 84; Livingston, supra note 69, at 834; Jefferson &
Carmichael, supra note 84.
92 See Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 81, at 488-490.
93 Such arguments make sense especially with the imposition of a cap. See
Livingston, supra note 69, at 826-829.
94 See supra note 84 & accompanying text.
95 See Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 690 (Iowa 1996) (noting the
testimony of plaintiffs expert that a pet who is regarded as a family member
"could be [valued] as high as the national debt"). See Livingston, supra note 69,
at fn.202.
96 See Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional
Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of Companionship for the Wrongful Death of
a Companion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33, 48 (1998):
The veterinary profession's public embrace of the bond between
humans and companion animals as a method of enticing clients
should alone estop them from trying to prevent claims by the
human companions of companion animals whom they have killed.
Damages sought for emotional distress and loss of companionship
explicitly derive from that bond.
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with medical liability, and the potential of statutory caps would remain a
very viable protection. Indeed, current statutory proposals with caps
have been introduced in a variety of states. 97 For instance, the Tennessee
state legislature passed the "T-Bo Act," which allows up to $4,000 in
non-economic damages in the negligent and intentional killing of
animal. 98 Additionally, unlike the medical industry, there are major
veterinary chains which are in a strong position to amortize reasonable
liability costs. 99 The veterinary industry is not a charitable industry, and
it does not appear necessary to subsidize it by providing liability
immunity. Nor is there any demonstrated reason to conclude that this
lack of accountability has not increased negligent conduct. Indeed,
negligent conduct as discussed above can simply lead to increased
veterinary expenses and profits to the industry if euthanasia is not
immediately applied. 100 The cost of the distrust towards the torts system
in this context can result in a less safe industry. There is thus no real
evidence that moderate liability would hurt the industry or prevent
reasonable access.
Beyond the veterinarian industry, the recent pet food poison cases
illustrate in another context the lack of tort accountability in the
protection of pets.'01 Indeed, the serial assurances that the pet food was
97 Similar legislation to Tennessee's T-Bo Act of 2000 has been introduced in
the state legislatures of New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island,
California, Colorado, Mississippi, and Michigan. Schwartz & Laird, supra note
60, at 248-49. Most legislative attempts have failed, but proponents of expanded
damages in pet lawsuits will likely redouble their efforts to enact legislation in
other states. Id. at 249-50.
98 TENN. CODE ANN. 44-17-403 (2000). Interestingly, this law excludes, among
others, licensed veterinarians and rural areas. Id. at. 44-17-403(e), (f).
Additionally, although it does not allow non-economic damages for acts of
negligence, an Illinois statute allows recovery when the animal is subjected to
aggravated cruelty or torture, or is injured or killed in bad faith when seized or
impounded. Livingston, supra note 69, at n.235.
99 The increasing consolidation of the veterinary industry is apparent. For
instance, Veterinary Centers of America (VCA) now owns 375 animal hospitals
in 37 states, as well as a clinical laboratory system that provides diagnostic
services to more than 14,000 veterinary clinics. VCA also employs 7,500 people
and had gross revenues of $613.8 million in 2005. Another company, Banfield:
The Pet Hospital, has opened more than 540 animal hospitals in conjunction
with PetSmart, the world's largest retailer of pet products. Healthy Pet and
National Veterinary Associates own 86 veterinary clinics in 28 states.
Heather B. Hayes, The Rise of the Corporate Veterinarian, VIRGINIA BUSINESS
MAGAZINE, Aug. 2006,
http://www.virginiaclassifieds.com/biz/virginiabusiness/magazine/yr2006/augO
6/vetl.shtml (last visited Nov. 2, 2008).
'oo See Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, supra note 81, at 531.101 "Measuring the tainted food's impact on animal health has proved an elusive
goal. Previous estimates have ranged from the FDA's admittedly low tally of
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safe, followed by several incremental recalls, raises the question of how
motivated the industry was to avoid additional pet deaths. 10 2 The danger
of contaminated animal food can also impact the human food chain as
well.10 3 It has been argued that market reputation of the pet food industry
remains a sufficient deterrence.1 14 The same argument could be made for
human food, particularly since humans get more feedback on the impact
of their food on their health. 10 5 Indeed, the Restatements (First) and
(Second) endorsed strict products liability based initially on cases that
first recognized this heightened liability in the context of food.10 6
Somewhat ironically, the Restatement (Third) rejects virtually any tort
protection for food in the context of animals by limiting liability to
roughly 16 confirmed deaths to the more than 3,000 unconfirmed cases logged
by one Web site." Thousands of Pets Probably Sickened by Food: Veterinary
Chain's Data Estimates 39,000 Animals Were Affected ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 9, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18029173/ (last visited Nov. 2,
2008).
102 While advising retailers to remove all brands from their shelves, Menu Foods
refused to expand the actual recall beyond dog and cat foods. Experts: More
Deaths From Pet Food Are Likely, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 24, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17754681/. The president and CEO of Menu
Foods, Paul Henderson, expressed his dismay at the food poisoning cases but
also admitted the company has not stopped manufacturing at the two plants
believed to have produced the contaminated pet food. David Kerley & Dan
Childs, Pet Food Maker to Take Financial Responsibility for Pet Deaths From
Poisoning, ABC NEWS, Mar. 23, 2007,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=2975912&page=l (last visited Nov. 2,
2008).
103 See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Benson, 275 N.W. 674 (Neb. 1937). The Nebraska
Supreme Court held the negligent seller of a sack of arsenic-tainted bran should
be liable for all damages to a farmer who had bought poisoned feedstock. Id. at
675-678. The farmer had fed the bran to his dairy cows, hogs, and chickens,
which caused the farmer not only to lose his business but also to suffer such
great emotional distress that his heart gave out and he died. Id. The court found
that the wrongful act of selling the poisoned bran proximately caused his mental
anxiety through the loss of his business. Id. at 678. The Nebraska Supreme
Court affirmed the sum of $3,500. Id. at 675, 679.
104 Professor Victor E. Schwartz quoted in The American Law Institute Annual
Proceedings: 84th Annual Meeting: 2007 Proceedings, 2007 A.L.I. Proc. 341
(2007).
105 "Pet owners can superficially inspect supplies and toys bought for their
animals, but they will have little way of knowing, for example, if the stuffing
inside a toy is harmful if ingested. And as lay persons, most owners will have to
simply trust the advice given by their veterinarian." Livingston, supra note 69,
at n.257.
106 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The majority of
American courts have also made this an established rule. See KEETON, supra
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economic lOSS. 10 7 For most pets, of course, this would be nominal. It is
not clear, however, that market forces can provide adequate deterrence
when in fact many pet deaths may not even be diagnosed as being
caused by food and there is little economic incentive for plaintiff lawyer
investigation. 108
A number of cases also impose liability for family heirlooms,
wedding films, and other pictures of special family events.10 9 In Mieske
v. Bartell Drug Co., 1° a retail store negligently lost or destroyed the
plaintiffs' movie film, which contained scenes of the plaintiffs' wedding,
honeymoon, vacations, Christmas gatherings, birthdays, Little League
participation by their son, family pets, the building of their home, and
irreplaceable footage of members of their family.111 The alternative
approach would have imposed liability simply for the undeveloped film
or other market value of the chattel, but there can be little debate that the
loss far exceeds the value of the film. 112 As the court in Mieske stated:
107 For provision on general applicability of recovery for economic loss, see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 21 (1998).
108 See supra note 101 & accompanying text.
109 See Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw. 1970) (allowing recovery of
mental distress for negligence in the destruction of a family's house); Green v.
Boston & Lowell R.R., 128 Mass. 221, 226-227 (Mass. 1880) (holding that
"[t]he just rule of damages is the actual value to him who owns it, taking into
the account its cost, the practicability and expense of replacing it, and such other
considerations as in the particular case affect its value to the owner"); Brown v.
Frontier Theatres, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1963) (stating that the concept of
adequate and reasonable compensation requires that one should recover more
than market value for the loss of items in an electrical fire which had their
primary value in sentiment); Bond v. A.H. Bolo Corp., 602 S.W.2d 105 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1980) (distinguishing from "used household goods, clothing, and
personal effects" that did not have any "sentimental" value, the court held that
one could take into consideration the feelings of the plaintiff owner for an
envelope filled with birth certificates, newspaper clippings, and photographs
negligently lost by defendant newspaper); Harvey v. Wheeler Transfer &
Storage Co., 277 N.W. 627, 629 (Wis. 1938) (holding that factors such as "the
description of the article, its original cost, and facts relative to its association
with the owner or his family, as well as the opinion of the owner as to its value"
matter in determining the sentimental value of keepsakes). But see Furlan v.
Rayan Photo Works, Inc., 12 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1939) (holding that photograph to
the owner does not include the element of sentimental value, the court limited
the plaintiffs recovery to nominal damages in the sum of five dollars).
"' 593 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Wash. 1979). See Wise, supra note 96, at n.187.
.. Mieske, 593 P.2d at 1309.
112 Certain types of property-such as family photographs or heirlooms-"have
no market value, simply because they are not salable" (quoting VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 548 (10th ed.
2000)). Schwartz & Laird, supra note 60, at 242.
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Plaintiffs lost not merely film able to capture images
by exposure but rather film upon which was recorded a
multitude of frames depicting many significant events in
their lives. Awarding plaintiffs the funds to purchase 32
rolls of blank film is hardly a replacement of the 32 rolls
of images which they had recorded over the years.'
13
In such special cases, consumers would likely be more willing to pay
the premium that increased liability would impose in order to better
insure the safety of their heirlooms and memories. Again, there appears
little policy compulsion for the Restatement (Third) to effectively
eliminate tort accountability in this context. Even the analogy to
excessive costs in the medical context evaporates in the case of
heirlooms.
IV. FEAR OF FUTURE INJURY AND DISEASE
Outside of the classic physical accident scenario such as an
automobile collision, the Restatement (Third) squelches most actions for
negligently inflicted mental distress. Section 46(b) does provide for
recovery "in the course of specified categories of activities,
undertakings, or relationships in which negligent conduct is especially
likely to cause serious emotional disturbance."' 1 4 This section refers
primarily to scenarios long recognized by tort law: the delivering of a
telegram erroneously announcing death or illness, or the mishandling of
a corpse or bodily remains.1 15 Unfortunately, the proposed Restatement
(Third), specifically in section 46, comment "h," rejects compensation
for fear of future injury arising from toxic exposure. It must be noted that
mental distress can be negligently created in a variety of contexts; for
example, a law professor could misstate a grade or the requirements for
an examination, and even strangers can create considerable apprehension
through misinformation. It is clear that limits are necessary to avoid
excessive liability to the insured community. Nevertheless, to preclude
recovery for mental distress over the potential of future injury derived
from exposure to toxic substances posing risks of disease such as
asbestosis or lung cancer raises serious issues. The Restatement (Third)
section 46, comment "h" explains its rational for this limitation: 116
One reason for this limitation is a concern that
multiple lawsuits-one when the person is exposed and
another when bodily injury occurs-would be required.
On the other hand, exposure to some substances, such as
113 Mieske, 593 P.2d at 1310-11.
114 See cases cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 46b (2007).
" Id. at § 46, cmt. d.
116 Id. at § 46, cmt. h.
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HIV, that create a risk of contracting a dreaded disease,
might create emotional harm in a way that does not raise
the issue of multiple lawsuits because the person can
determine relatively quickly whether the exposure
actually did cause actual physical injury. These cases are
more akin to those in which a person is put in danger of
being hit by an automobile and thereby suffers
emotional disturbance. In both the automobile and the
HIV-exposure cases, the period during which the person
is subject to risk and suffers emotional disturbance is
(unlike the cancerphobia cases) relatively confined.
Thus, Subsection (a) applies to cases in which the period
between exposure and the termination of disease is
sufficiently short.
The irony in the Restatement's analysis is foremost that mental
distress, covering a short period of time, for fear of future injury is
compensable, but more onerous mental distress covering a longer period
is not. Thus, the greater the harm, the less likely the Restatement would
permit recovery. The explanation of avoiding issues of multiple lawsuits
appears to be a red herring. Injury in the form of fear of future disease is
sufficiently real and independent of the actual disease. For example, no
one would question that drinking from a negligently contaminated well,
would cause real distress to the victims whose risk of cancer had been
dramatically increased. Furthermore, the problems of causation which
often preclude recovery are most significant for injuries that may occur
in the distant future, increasing the likelihood that there would be no
compensation at all. On the other hand allowing recovery for distress for
injuries that are likely to occur in the near future will often ensure
multiple recoveries for those victims who do develop the disease and can
more easily prove the causation due to temporal proximity. In addition,
compensating for fear of future disease provides an important deterrent
against negligent exposure to toxins, where otherwise the likelihood of
accountability would be very limited. In the end, lurking behind the
Restatement's analysis is likely the unstated practical concern that
compensating for short-term distress is not economically burdensome
while compensating for long-term distress would be. The concern about
excessive liability on the insured community is not by any means an
unimportant issue. It is, however, essential to determine whether that
concern can be addressed without creating the anomaly of compensating
for lesser but not greater injuries. This is particularly true, as when noted
above, the mental distress claim may be the primary basis for deterring
wrongful conduct by ensuring accountability.
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A. LIABILITY FOR FEAR OF FUTURE DISEASE WITHOUT PHYSICAL INJURY
Several cases, some acknowledged by the Restatement, have
imposed liability for distress over toxic exposure increasing significantly
the risk of disease. In Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,117 the
California Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiffs' exposure to
toxic chemicals could support a cause of action for negligent infliction of
emotional distress arising from their fear of cancer. Firestone repeatedly
dumped liquid waste at a facility classified for solid waste only despite
numerous warnings from their own engineer that such practices were
contrary both to company policy and California law. The Court rejected
the idea that recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress is
restricted in California to only cases involving physical injury or
bystander recovery. The physical injury requirement urged by the
defendants was seen as both "overinclusive and underinclusive when
viewed in the light of its purported purpose of screening false claims
[and also as a requirement that] encourages extravagant pleading and
distorted testimony."' 1 8 While "meaningful limits on the class of
potential plaintiffs and clear guidelines for resolving disputes in advance
of trial are necessary, imposing a physical injury requirement represents
an inherently flawed and inferior means of attempting to achieve these
goals."119 The court noted the necessary limitation that fear of cancer
claims must be objectively reasonable. While admitting that it "would be
very hard pressed to find that, as a matter of law, a plaintiff faced with a
20 or 30 percent chance of developing cancer cannot genuinely,
seriously and reasonably fear the prospect of cancer,"' 120 the court
nonetheless concluded "for the public policy reasons identified below,
that emotional distress caused by the fear of a cancer that is not probable
should generally not be compensable in a negligence action.",12 1 Policy
concerns included the cost of a potentially unlimited plaintiff class on
the legal system, a potential negative impact on the healthcare system
fearful of liability arising from prescription drugs with potentially
harmful effects, potential further impact on the medical malpractice
crisis, and the fact that "allowing recovery to all victims who have a fear
of cancer may work to the detriment of those who sustain actual physical
injury and those who ultimately develop cancer as a result of toxic
exposure" by using up the resources of defendants, leaving them unable
to pay future judgments against them. 122 "A [further] reason supporting
the imposition of a more likely than not limitation is to establish a
117 863 P.2d 795 (1993).
'" Id. at 987.
"9 Id. at 988.
120 Id. at 990.
2 Id. at 990.
122 Id. at 993.
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sufficiently definite and predictable threshold for recovery to permit
consistent application from case to 
case. '123
The Potter case imposes a significant minimum threshold by
requiring that mental distress be based on the likelihood (over 50%) that
the victim will in fact suffer the disease. Other jurisdictions have been
more generous. In Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services, Inc.,12 4 the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the claims of a seaman who
was drenched with the toxic chemicals benzene, toluene, and xyolene in
the course of employment, due to an alleged defect in the equipment
being used. Although the court held that the plaintiffs brief period of
dizziness, and leg cramps suffered immediately after his exposure
constituted a physical injury, this was not a necessary element of his
mental distress claim arising out of his fear of contracting cancer.
[I]t is doubtful that the trier of fact is any less able
to decide the factor extent of mental suffering in the
event of a physical injury or impact. With or without
physical injury or impact, a plaintiff is entitled to
recover damages for serious mental distress arising from
fear of developing cancer where his fear is reasonable
and causally related to the defendant's negligence. The
circumstances surrounding the fear-inducing occurrence
may themselves supply sufficient indicia of
genuineness. It is for the jury to decide questions such as
the existence, severity, and reasonableness of fear. 1
25
Consequently the Fifth Circuit merely requires reasonable fear, a far
more generous standard than the California Supreme Court in Potter.
The decision in Hagerty-that mental distress damages for fear of cancer
are recoverable even in the absence of physical injury was reaffirmed by
Smith v. A.C. & S. Inc..126 This case, however, applied the limitation that
the fear be genuine and specific, denying recovery because the plaintiff
testified only to a general concern for his future health and not to a
specific fear of cancer.
123 Id. at 993.
124 788 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1986).
125 Id. at 318.
126 843 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1988). In a diversity case applying Louisiana law, the
court followed the rule in Hagerty v. L & L Marine Services Inc., 788 F.2d 315
(5th Cir. 1986), that mental distress damages for fear of cancer are recoverable
even in the absence of physical injury. However in this case because the
plaintiff had testified only to a general concern for his future health, and not
specifically to a fear of cancer, the court held that evidence relating to an
increased risk of contracting cancer was inadmissible.
[Vol. 16:1
HeinOnline  -- 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 166 2008-2009
Fall 2008] Rethinking Compensation for Mental Distress 167
In Bonnette v. Cononco, Inc.,127 the Louisiana Supreme Court
considered the claims of numerous plaintiffs suing because they were
sold soil containing asbestos fibers that had been removed from
Conoco's construction site facility in Calcasieu Parrish, alleging that
Conoco was negligent in failing to test the soil before allowing it to be
transported off the premises, and in failing to warn the excavator that it
contained asbestos. The trial court's finding that compensation for
increased risk could be premised on a "slight" increase in the chance of
contracting an asbestos related disease was overturned as was an award
for mental anguish arising from the plaintiffs' fears of future injury. The
court quoted the Texas Supreme Court, noting that "most Americans are
daily subjected to toxic substances in the air they breathe and the food
they eat. Suits for mental anguish damages caused by exposure that has
not resulted in disease would compete with suits for manifest diseases
for the legal system's limited resources.0 28 Bonnette required that "in
order for plaintiffs to recover emotional distress damages in the absence
of a manifest physical injury, they must prove their claim is not spurious
by showing a particular likelihood of genuine and serious mental distress
arising from special circumstances. 1 29 That the fear of future injury was
reasonable was insufficient to support recovery. Nevertheless, the
decision does not preclude imposing liability when the showing of
genuine and serious mental distress is sufficient.
The In re Moorenovich1 30 court held that Maine would recognize a
claim for damages based on present anxiety and fear that the plaintiffs
will contract cancer arising out of exposure to asbestos, even in the
absence of any physical injury. The court acknowledged that many states
have been very hesitant to expand the scope of negligent infliction of
emotional distress beyond recovery parasitic to a physical injury.
However, with the acceptance of a bystander recovery for negligent
infliction of mental distress "the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has
shifted its focus from a requirement of physical injury to defendants [sic]
duty not to create the potential for such harm in analyzing emotional
distress cases.'"1 31 Potential liability was limited in this case by the fact
that "[f]irst, that any anxiety must have been proximately caused by
plaintiffs exposure to asbestos. Moreover, the anxiety must be
reasonable. Finally, defendants must be legally responsible for the
plaintiffs exposure to asbestos."'[32 The Moorenevich court appears to
side with Hagerty in allowing reasonable claims of emotional distress
127 837 So. 2d 1219 (La., 2003).
128 Id. at 1235.
129 Id. at 1235.
130 634 F Supp 634 (D. Me. 1986).
131 Id. at 637.
132 Id. at 637.
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without imposing artificial limitations based on a specific likelihood of
contracting the feared disease.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Sterling v. Velsicol
Chemical Corp.,133 considered the claims of a number of residents
exposed to toxic chemicals in their well water as a result of their
improper disposal. Under Tennessee law "mental distress which results
from the fear that an already existent injury will lead to the future onset
of an as yet unrealized disease, constitutes an element of recovery only
where such distress is either foreseeable or is a natural consequence of,
or reasonably expected to flow., 134 The central inquiry for mental
distress damages flowing from fear of future injury in Sterling was not
merely the percentage chance that disease would materialize; although
the plaintiffs suffered physical injury, the Sixth Circuit appeared to
affirm the principal that so long as "each plaintiff produced evidence that
they personally suffered from a reasonable fear of contracting cancer or
some other disease in the future as a result of ingesting [toxic]
chemicals" their fears were compensable.1 35 The foregoing cases
demonstrate that at least a handful of courts have been willing to
entertain claims for negligently inflicted mental distress arising out of
fear of future injury without imposing artificial limitations on recovery
based on the existence of physical impact or injury.
B. LIABILITY OF FEAR OF FUTURE DISEASE WITH PHYSICAL INJURY.
Most courts would grant recovery for mental distress for the risk of
future disease if the distress is parasitic to a physical injury. Indeed, this
appears to be a reaffirmation of classic tort law principal derived from
the original impact rule. 136 However, a number of jurisdictions have been
extremely flexible in defining what constitutes a physical injury. For
example, in Bryson v. Pillsbury Co.,1 37 the court considered whether
asymptomatic chromosomal damage constituted a physical injury that
could support parasitic recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. The plaintiffs and defendant's experts disputed whether the
chromosomal damage Bryson received as a result of entering a pond
contaminated with the pesticide Captan was a present physical injury.
Simply because the plaintiff's injuries were subcellular, the Bryson court
was unwilling to say that they were not real, and the conflicting
testimony made the case ultimately a question for the jury to decide
855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988).
'
34 Id. at 1205-06.
135 Id. at 1206.
136 See supra note 27 & accompanying text.
137 573 N.W.2d 718 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998).
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whether the chromosomal breakage constituted a present physical
injury.
138
The Tennessee Supreme Court in Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., Inc.,13 9 held that exposure to the toxin chlordane was a sufficient
"physical injury" to support recovery for mental anguish despite the fact
that blood tests showed no abnormalities. For months after the plaintiffs'
home was sprayed for termites, they noticed a foul smell and taste to
their water supply. The court sustained a jury instruction stating "if [the
plaintiffs] ingested any amount of the toxic substance, it is the judgment
of the Court that that is at least a technical physical injury ... where there
is any physical injury at all-any attendant mental pain and suffering is
compensable.,
140
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, applying New Jersey law
in Herber v. Johns-Manville Corp.,41 held that pleural thickening
resulting from asbestos exposure constituted a physical impact which
could support recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress, in
the form of fear of contracting cancer. This case was distinguished from
those where plaintiff had suffered no physical impact or injury, where
physical manifestation of emotional distress is required for recovery.
"Because the jury in this case found that exposure to the defendants'
asbestos had caused pleural thickening, we are confident that the
Supreme Court of New Jersey would treat Mr. Herber's emotional
distress claim no differently than a pain and suffering claim in a slip and
fall case. 142 And "while appellees' intimate that the infiltration of Mr.
Herber's lungs may be characterized as involving little impact and the
pleural thickening as involving insubstantial injury, only slight impact
and injury have been found by the New Jersey courts to warrant recovery
for emotional distress caused by fear.'
143
Employees allegedly exposed to high doses of radiation in the course
of their work at a nuclear weapons facility in Day v. NLO,' 44 were
allowed to recover for their negligently inflicted mental distress without
the requirement that it be "severe and debilitating because "the severe
and debilitating requirement does not apply to emotional distress cases
which are accompanied by physical injury."' 145 Although the court held
that low doses of radiation alone do not constitute a physical injury, "if
138 Id. at 721.
139 639 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1982).
140 Id. at 434.
14' 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3rd Cir. 1986).
142 Id. at 85.
143 Id. at 85.
144 851 F Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio, 1994).
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the [p]laintiffs could prove that they were exposed to sufficiently high
dose of radiation, this in itself [would] constitute a physical injury,
sufficient to bring their action for emotional distress based on their
exposure." 146 Even in the event of impact the plaintiffs were also
required to show that they have actually suffered emotional distress from
fear of cancer, and that such fears are reasonable. The court also
recognized that in the absence of physical injury a plaintiff could still
bring a claim for emotional distress if such distress was "severe and
debilitating." 147 "Just like a physical injury, the severe and debilitating
requirement ensures that liability probably will not be affixed for
emotional distress claims which are speculative or even fraudulent., 148
The above decisions suggest that even a number of courts that do not
appear to subscribe to allowing mental distress without physical injury in
fact so define physical injury to virtually equate it with toxic contact.
149
However, it is true that a number of other courts also cited by the
Restatement (Third) are more stringent in requiring a physical impact or
injury. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court supports a stricter
view of physical injury as prerequisite to mental distress recovery for
fear of future disease. In Simmons v. Pacor, Inc.,150 it held that
asymptomatic pleural thickening is not a compensable injury, and could
146 Id. at 878.
141 Id. at 879.
141 Id. at 879.
149 See also Mauro v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 225 N.J. Super. 196 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988), where the court considered the claims of a plumber
occupationally exposed to asbestos. The court upheld a jury verdict giving
damages for fear of cancer to the plaintiff who had pleural thickening, but had
no clinical symptoms of asbestos exposure and no physical manifestations of his
emotional distress.
The trial judge charged the jury that in order for the plaintiff to
recover for emotional distress related to his enhanced risk of
cancer, the jury must find plaintiff was currently suffering from
serious fear or emotional distress, his fear was proximately caused
by his exposure to asbestos, and the fear was reasonable.
Id. at 208. The court noted that "our Supreme Court abandoned the concept that
physical impact was a predicate to a recovery for fright or emotional distress.
However, in such cases, plaintiff must demonstrate that the fright or emotional
distress resulted in 'substantial bodily injury or sickness."' Id. at 209 (citation
omitted). The court also noted that "proof that emotional distress has resulted in
.substantial bodily injury or sickness' is not required when plaintiff suffers from
a present physical disease attributable to defendant's tortious conduct." Id. at
209. The court in this case noted that the third circuit, in applying New Jersey
law, had already allowed recovery of emotional distress damages by a plaintiff
with pleural thickening. Id. at 210.
150 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996),
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not support a claim for mental anguish. The plaintiffs in this case sought
recovery for their mental distress on the theory that pleural thickening,
visible on a chest x-ray, constituted a physical injury. Because in
Pennsylvania, the presence of "nonmalignant, asbestos related lung
pathology, whether or not accompanied by clinical symptoms" did not
trigger the statute of limitations for a later occurring disease, the court
reasoned that the "natural extension ... is to preclude an action for
asymptomatic pleural thickening since [a]ppellants are permitted to
commence an action when the symptoms and physical impairment
actually develop."1 51 Absent physical injury, recovery for negligent
infliction of emotional distress in Pennsylvania is restricted to specific
exception to which this case does not belong. According to the court in
Pacor, "damages for fear of cancer are speculative ... [t]he actual
compensation due to the plaintiff can be more accurately assessed when
the disease has manifested.'52
151 Id. at 237.
152 Id. at 238. See also Temple-Inland Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993 S.W.2d 88
(Tex. 1999), where the Texas Supreme Court rejected emotional distress claims
of electrical workers negligently exposed to asbestos but not suffering from
asbestos related disease. The court overturned the ruling of the court of appeals
which had held that "a plaintiff may recover for mental anguish based upon fear
of cancer even though the evidence shows the plaintiff does not have, and in
reasonable medical probability, will not have cancer, so long as there has been
exposure to the causative agent and the fear is reasonable." Id. at 90. The
general rule, the court noted, is that plaintiffs not suffering physical injury may
not recover for emotional distress, and the exposure in this case did not fall into
any of the exceptions. However, in this summary judgment proceeding the court
accepted the plaintiffs' claims that their exposure constituted a physical injury,
but still denied their claim for damages. "While the existence of physical injury
is ordinarily necessary for recovery of mental anguish damages except in those
instances already mentioned, such injury may not be sufficient for recovery of
mental anguish damages when the injury has not produced disease, despite a
reasonable fear that such disease will develop." Id. at 92. The court grounded its
decision on the policy concerns that the long latency period of asbestos related
harm makes it very difficult to evaluate whether exposure claims are truly
meritorious, which in turn makes liability difficult to predict. "The question is
not, of course, whether Carter and Wilson have themselves suffered genuine
distress over their own exposure. We assume they have, and that their anxiety is
reasonable. The question, rather, is whether this type of claim-for fear of an
increased risk of developing an asbestos-related disease when no disease is
presently manifest-should be permitted .... " Id. at 93. To this the court
answers in the negative. The court did however caution that "[t]he principles we
have used to deny recovery of mental anguish damages for fear of the
possibility of developing a disease as a result of an exposure to asbestos may
not yield the same result when the exposure is to some other dangerous or toxic
element." Id. at 94. HeinOnline  -- 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 171 2008-2009
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In Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley,' 53 the Supreme
Court reversed the ruling of the Second Circuit, and held that a pipe fitter
exposed daily to considerable amounts of asbestos could not recover for
negligently inflicted emotional distress in the absence of a physical
injury under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Physical
contact with insulation dust containing asbestos did not amount "to a
'physical impact', as this Court used that term in Gottshall" such that it
could sustain a recovery for emotional distress: 
54
Taken together, the language and cited precedent
indicate that the words "physical impact" do not
encompass every form of physical contact. And, in
particular, they do not include a contact that amounts to
no more than an exposure-an exposure, such as that
before us, to a substance that poses some future risk of
disease and which contact causes emotional distress
only because the worker learns that he may become ill
after a substantial period of time. 155
The Court also noted that common law courts have restricted
recovery for damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress to
narrowly defined categories for policy reasons cited in Gottshall that
militate against an expansive definition of "physical impact.' 56 "Those
reasons include: (a) special difficulty for judges and juries in separating
valid, important claims from those that are invalid or trivial; (b) a threat
of unlimited and unpredictable liability and (c) the potential for a flood
of comparatively unimportant or trivial claims (internal quotation marks
omitted)."'' 57 Because some degree of contact with carcinogenic
substances is extremely common in modern society, the Court observed
that such a rule would open the courts to a large number of claims
without providing a meaningful analysis to separate meritorious from
unmeritorious claims. The Court also expressed concern that allowing
claims for emotional distress caused by fear of cancer might exhaust the
resources of potential defendants so that they could not pay later claims
by those who had actually contracted cancer.
5 8
Justice Ginsburg in her partially concurring and dissenting opinion
argued, "Buckley's extensive contact with asbestos particles in Grand
Central's tunnels, as I comprehend his situation, constituted physical
153Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
114 Id. at 429.
... Id. at 432.
156 Id. at 433.
'57 Id. at 434 (citation omitted).
158 Id. at 434-36.
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impact as that term was used in Gottshall."'59 While the majority in
Metro-North are candid in their concern about unlimited and
unpredictable liability and a flood of trivial claims, Justice Ginsburg's
opinion indicates concern that the tortfeasors should be held accountable
and supports the argument that there can be strict evidence of authentic
mental distress. On the facts, Justice Ginsburg found that the plaintiff
failed "to present objective evidence of severe emotional distress."
Nevertheless, Justice Ginsburg's analysis seems to side with those cases
that would hold that toxic contact, itself, in fact constitutes physical
impact sufficient to warrant liability for fear of future disease from
exposure when properly documented. As noted above, the Ginsburg
opinion, along with other similar court decisions, while ostensibly
adhering to the requirement that there be adequate impact or physical
injury to award emotional damages are, in fact, so expansive that the
decisions in essence essentially endorse liability without physical injury.
It is important in evaluating judicial support for emotional liability in
this context not to allocate these decisions inappropriately on the side
against liability for fear of future injury in the event of toxic exposure. If
such decisions are properly classified it is clear that judicial opinion on
this topic, including important courts such as the California Supreme
160
Court, is far more unsettled than some courts may assert.
C. THE POLICY DEBATE
Professors Henderson and Twerski, in Asbestos Litigation Gone
Mad: Exposure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress,
and Medical Monitoring,'61 acknowledge that claims based on negligent
infliction of emotional distress are at least superficially plausible but
reject them on policy grounds. They note at the outset that courts have
traditionally restricted negligent infliction of emotional distress claims
out of "concern that allowing recovery for mental upset based on
inadvertent conduct is an invitation to open-ended and uncontrollable
litigation.' 62 They argue that tort "was never designed to allow
compensation for general malaise that follows upon the heels of
negligent conduct. Rather, it allows recovery for serious and immediate
emotional distress arising from conduct that was either violent or
traumatic in nature."'163 The risk of injury in asbestos cases, according to
9 Id. at 445.
160 See Potter v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795 (1993); supra note 118
& accompanying text.
161 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Absestos Litigation Gone
Mad: Evopsure-Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and
Mledical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 815 (2002).
162 Id. at 824.
163 Id. at 827.
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the authors, is too remote to justify any award for mental distress. 164
These cases also present serious challenges to separating meritorious
from non-meritorious claims.1 65 The authors also express concern that
allowing such claims gives precedence to those less seriously injured and
that negligent infliction of emotional distress claims might exhaust the
resources of defendants, leaving them unable to compensate those who
do eventually develop serious diseases.
166
While these arguments have great appeal, it is not general malaise
that is being compensated, but reasonable mental distress arising from a
specific wrongdoing that otherwise is not likely to be deterred. Instead of
banning mental distress, it would appear more desirable to follow the
lead of Potter, Hagerty, and Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Metro-North
and allow at least some restricted compensation. Professors Henderson
and Twerski's argument that mental distress compensation is limited to
reactions to immediate, violent events appears to focus on important
lines of cases, but ignores the full depth of current non-economic
compensation. Twerski and Henderson themselves cite to California
cases, including Ochoa v. Superior Court167 and Molien v. Kaiser168 that
demonstrate the willingness of courts to compensate in situations going
beyond immediate violent events. In Ochoa, the parents' distress in
viewing their child's deterioration for failure to be transferred into a
hospital facility leads to mental distress. 169 In Molien, the misdiagnosis
for syphilis in one spouse leads to recriminations by the other and
ultimately a divorce. 17 It also seems appropriate to consider the tort of
loss of consortium and society and compensation for loss of
companionship in many wrongful death cases. While not technically
emotional distress this non-economic emotional compensation is hardly
associated with sudden accidents, but pervades tortious injuries.
Furthermore, rather than try to encapsulate the present scattering of cases
it seems far more useful to seek a comprehensive policy analysis of
when emotional compensation should be awarded. The Twerski,
Henderson approach of isolating the majority line of cases and ignoring
substantial development in other areas should be replaced by the kind of
functional analysis Twerski and Henderson themselves advanced for
products liability.1 71 In short, the cases on this subject remain, and the
real question is when does functionality justify compensating for
Id. at 832.
165 Id. at 833.
166 Id. at 834.
117 Ochoa, 703 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1985).
168 Molien, 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980).
169 Ochoa, 703 P.2d at 5.
170 Molien, 616 P.2d at 821.
171 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 1, cmt.
[Vol. 16:1
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intangible losses whether characterized as mental distress or loss of
society.
V. CONCLUSION
Tort law has historically compensated for mental distress in a variety
of contexts. In the intentional torts such as assault and battery, courts
have long awarded victims payments for injuries that were exclusively or
primarily affronts to their mental tranquility. 172 Negligent liability has
been more circumspect in imposing liability for emotional loss.
Nevertheless, negligent infliction of mental distress has long been
accepted when parasitic to physical injury. 173 Subsequent development
has expanded it to near miss cases and in the majority of jurisdictions
now to bystanders witnessing physical injury to a family member.1
74
Also, as discussed above, special categories including negligent
telegrams misinforming about death and negligent handling of bodies
have routinely supported liability for anguish.1 75 Wrongful death and
loss of consortium also provide for intangible mental damages, albeit not
pain and suffering per se. 176 The early Restatements have been
innovative in expanding liability for mental distress. By contrast the
Restatement (Third) has ratified current development but clearly
enunciated opposition to recovery even where case law is decidedly
mixed. Two notable illustrations include mental distress for destruction
of pets and heirlooms as well as mental distress for fear of increased
likelihood of future disease. In both these areas important jurisdictions
are divided. 177 But comments "h" and "j" in section 46 of Restatement
172 In Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 699
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994), the court allowed recovery by an anti-smoking advocate
noting that "[n]o matter how trivial the incident, a battery is actionable, even if
damages are only one dollar."
173 See KEETON, supra note 8, at § 57; see also DOBBS, supra note 9, at §§ 308-
309.
174 Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (formulating a test whereby bystanders
who were present and witnessed an accident could recover for negligently
inflicted emotional distress if they have a close relationship with the victim and
their mental distress was caused by direct sensory perception of the accident).
175 The proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts § 46 cmt. d notes that in addition
to the traditional categories of mishandling a body or negligently informing a
relative about death that this exception has also been used in cases involving
consumption of food which has then been found to contain a "repulsive foreign
object[] such as a condom or a rodent."
176 See DIAMOND, supra note 1, at § 10.03.
177 For example the Supreme Court of California, arguably the nation's most
important state court, in Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795,
810 (Cal. 1993), recognized claims for negligent infliction of mental distress
arising out of fear of future injury from toxic exposure, albeit with limitations.
In Bond v. A.H. Belo Corp., 602 S.W.2d 105, 105 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980), aHeinOnline  -- 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 175 2008-2009
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(Third) presume that the unsettled area should be cleansed of any
potential liability development. This approach ignores the fact that what
is lacking in current case law development and the proposed Restatement
is a comprehensive organizing principle that can help to define in a
principled way when emotional distress should be compensated,
particularly in the context of negligence.
It is well accepted that emotional distress constitutes a significant
loss. The debate focuses on when culpable conduct should or should not
lead to liability. As a general principle, I would argue that mental
distress should at a minimum be compensated when the business activity
being held accountable would otherwise escape significant tort liability.
Otherwise the industry is simply immunized from the utilitarian
functions provided by tort law, including most notably deterrence. The
tort of negligent misrepresentation for example, 178 which allows under
circumscribed situations recovery for pure economic loss, focuses on
Texas court recognized that the jury could consider the emotional value of
certain chattels which the court distinguished from ordinary personal effects.
178 The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides this definition of negligent
misrepresentation:
(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession, or
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance on the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence
in obtaining and communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the
information to influence or knows that the recipient so intends or
in a substantially similar transaction.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the
information extends to loss suffered by any of the class of persons
for whose benefit the duty is created, in any of the transactions in
which it is intended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1965). Other courts have taken both
more restrictive and more permissive views of liability. In Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), the New York Court of Appeals denied
recovery to third parties except to those in a relationship to the auditor "akin to
privity." One the other side of the issue the New Jersey Supreme Court in H.
Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (N.J. 1983) imposed a duty to all
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professional information providers such as accountants where the
absence of physical injuries would otherwise preclude negligence
accountability. Only in other very limited circumstances is pure
economic loss, which is not parasitic to personal injury or property
damage, recoverable. The negligent misrepresentation tort has
undoubtedly imposed liability costs on access to professional services as
well as prompting judicial effort to limit recovery to proportional
amounts, but yet is still viewed as necessary to provide accountability in
tort where otherwise negligence would go undeterred. The Restatement
(Third) by limiting recovery for negligent destruction of pets and
heirlooms has essentially barred recovery for professional conduct in
related industries.
At the May 2007 American Law Institute 179 annual meeting,
Professor Powers, co-reporter for the Restatement, responded to an
inquiry that tort liability for negligent infliction of mental distress
consistently under deters wrongful conduct. This is certainly true in pet
and heirloom categories. In contrast, the expansion to the bystander rule
is an area where the physical injuries and parasitic pain and suffering to
the primary victim usually dwarfs the ancillary recovery for bystanders.
In fact, with loss of consortium as well as negligent infliction of
emotional distress available to supplement personal injury and wrongful
death claims, a multitude of liabilities can, depending on the
circumstances, provide almost redundant deterrence for a single
negligent act. The arguments against imposing liability in the case of
pets and heirlooms really repeat the arguments against imposing tort
liability at all. Unfortunately, negligent infliction of mental distress has
not been viewed in the context of all potential liability and has been
exploited and recognized as a compensable loss most particularly where
other loses do not provide adequate accountability. As I have argued
previously,1 80 in many cases such as bystander liability, emotional loss
could most efficiently be limited to economic consequences of that loss
such as medical expenses for heart attacks and lost wages. Tort law
currently compensates mental distress most frequently where it
compensates other losses and, in the contexts of accidents, where tort
law routinely is litigated. Instead, there should be an emphasis on
exploiting accountability for mental distress where the protection of tort
law is absent, and otherwise negligence could go undeterred and losses
of victims not vindicated. The current approach to negligent infliction of
mental distress appears to treat it as a wayward stepchild to be tolerated
out of historical, if not family loyalty, but constrained, where not
entrenched, to avoid further embarrassment. In some ways, this approach
179 The American Law Institute Annual Proceedings: 84th Annual Meeting:
2007 Proceedings, 2007 A.L.I. Proc. 320 (2007).
'80 See DIAMOND, supra note 47, at 501-04.
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to liability for mental distress represents a questioning of the basic
function and desirability of tort law. While other systems such as market
accountability, regulatory supervisions, and first party compensation
systems exist, the Restatement (Third)'s approach to mental distress,
unlike previous Restatements may be an unintentional acknowledgement
that tort law can better be substituted by other systems. In the specific
context of mental distress and the general context of negligence, there is
I think instead much that these torts can contribute.
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